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Introduction
A key political concern for the United States (US) since World War II has been its
dependence on foreign energy. These concerns have arisen from a volatile nature of crude
oil prices and the country’s preexisting beliefs of peak oil in the early 1970s, resulting in
unpredictable energy markets. Highlighted have been episodes of rising oil prices leading
to recessions, higher inflation rates, and economic stagnation (Brown and Yucel, 2013).
Changing this story are recent gains in both crude oil and natural gas production, helping
to vault the country to at least temporary energy stardom. In fact, 2014 statistics from the
US Energy Information Administration (EIA) showed that domestic total technically
recoverable shale gas resources are at 665 trillion cubic feet. The EIA also showed that in
the year 2000 natural gas from shale formations provided only 1% of US natural gas
production; by 2010 it was over 20% and the EIA predicts that by 2035, 46% of the
natural gas supply will come from shale gas.
Regarding oil, domestic reserves of total technically recoverable shale oil are
estimated at 58 billion barrels (US EIA, 2014). In addition to shale oil, an updated
announcement in 2009 from the US Geological Survey showed more reserves in an
existing formation, resulting in an even larger amount of total technically recoverable oil
shale reserves at 2.6 trillion barrels, according to the Institute for Energy Research. This
revolution has helped to turn the vulnerabilities related to energy into strengths by
potentially supporting the country’s energy needs for the next several hundred years at
current consumption rates.
The news also brings critical energy policy implications, as the reserves have the
potential to significantly lower domestic energy prices and bring energy independence to
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the US. The findings in this paper provide insight on the pricing in natural gas and crude
oil commodities markets seen after the shale boom, which are then related to economic
performance in the US. I begin with a review of carbon-based energy markets, the history
of hydraulic fracturing, a literature review, and then continue with the theoretical model
and methodology.
By kinked times series regression I simultaneously attempt to determine and
estimate any changes seen in 10 different US spot and futures prices of crude oil and
natural gas before and after the shale boom. This information is important as these prices
sequentially affect the prices seen in broader energy markets, such as those of electricity
and transportation, while also impacting policy-making as the country continues to seek
cleaner energy. In the event of a decline in energy prices, not only does it provide an
avenue for economic growth but also the potential to reshape the future of energy markets
and further stimulate research and development.
For the analysis I follow microeconomic theory such that an increase in supply of
a good will result in lower prices for that good. Because of the shale boom, the domestic
supply and estimated available reserves of both crude oil and natural gas became
increasingly large and I hypothesize a decline in the prices of both commodities.
Additionally, there has never been a general agreed upon consensus on the causality issue
of whether economic growth leads to declining energy prices, or if cheaper energy is
causal to more rapid economic development. Thus, the last component I investigate is a
question similar to this, where I test the effect of energy prices on US gross domestic
product (GDP). My hypothesis here is that if there is a decline in energy prices, there will
be an associated rise in US GDP.
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Carbon-Based Energy Markets
US energy market volatility dates back many years to the 1860s and up through
World War II. Some worldwide stability finally came throughout parts of the 1950s-60s,
as there was more than one power in the world oil market. The volatility notably returned
in the 1970s after the Yom Kippur War, where in December 1973 oil prices spiked 130%
over and above the earlier 70% spike in October of that same year after the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo (Ross, 2013). When the embargo
was lifted, oil prices were $12 per barrel, roughly four times the pre-crisis price. This
shock resulted in years of inflation and stagnation for many oil-importing countries and
further instability in oil prices with the newly gained market power of OPEC.
Faced with more expensive oil, oil-importing countries were left with the decision
to pay the higher prices, cut back on oil consumption, or seek new and alternative energy
sources. Choosing the latter, the US made large investments in alternative energy and
energy efficiency. The results were further developing technologies in energy sources
such as coal, natural gas, and nuclear power, helping to revolutionize the energy industry
and the outlook on its future. Additionally, the US was given a head start on the idea of
energy conservation, given the perception of an imminent depletion of global oil and gas
reserves after the addresses of President Jimmy Carter on the energy crisis, where he
warned that oil wells “were drying up all over the world” (Ross, 2013). Carter also urged
for price deregulation and fuel switching to solar energy and other renewable sources,
while further developing the energy potential from fossil fuels in shale formations.
In attempt to alleviate fuel shortages and find stability in energy pricing, the
United States government began further spending on energy innovation within the
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country. Federal energy investment rose sevenfold from 1973-1979 (Ross, 2013), where
the largest gains were seen in fossil fuel energy research and development programs,
which grew from $143 million in 1974 to $1.41 billion in 1979 (Dooley, 2008). Another
longer period estimate from Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2011) states that federal
Energy Department investment expenditures approached $24 billion for fossil fuel
research from 1978-2007, where billions more were also spent through the Gas Research
Institute and on unconventional gas credits.
However, in 1979 after the Iranian revolution and the fall of the Shah another oil
shock was seen. This shock was a decline in worldwide crude oil production of roughly
10%, causing widespread panic and driving the price of crude oil from just under $16 per
barrel to nearly $40 per barrel between 1980-81 (Kubarych, 2005). In the following 25
years three more large oil shocks occur, but collectively the realization of the country’s
oil dependence and vulnerability to imported energy to go along with the fear of running
out of oil spurned large investments in energy research and development. Following the
need to exploit other existing energy sources, government investment, private
entrepreneurship, technology innovations, private land and mineral rights ownership,
high natural gas prices in the 2000s, and a number of other factors all made important
contributions to an energy revolution and what is now known as the shale boom (Wang &
Krupnick, 2013).
The Difference Between Shale Gas, Shale Oil and Oil Shale
For the purposes of this paper I only concern the energy production from shale
formations, but for clarification, shale gas, shale oil, and oil shale are vastly different
energy resources with different scales of proven reserves despite their similar names.
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Within shale rock formations both natural gas and crude oil can be found. Shale gas is
simply natural gas trapped in a shale formation, and shale oil is a high quality crude oil
trapped in shale rock that does not require special processing. Oil shale on the other hand
is not oil nor is it necessarily found in shale rock. It is instead a precursor to oil as it is a
sedimentary rock containing kerogen and is rich in organic material. To actually be of use
the oil shale must be heated to 600-750 degrees Fahrenheit to separate the kerogen from
the rock, which can then be extracted from a well using the traditional method. The
resultant petroleum-like liquid can then be processed into superior quality and high value
liquid fuels, however the technologies for developing oil shale are still underdeveloped
and unrelated to my paper.!
Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking) and Its History
Hydraulic fracturing is a simple process. It frees trapped high quality crude oil or
natural gas by creating fractures in the surrounding rock formation by injecting the rock
with high pressure bursts of a mixture of water, proppant (frac sand) and industry-specific
chemicals after drilling. The proppant is left behind in the newly created cracks, thus
holding open or “propping open” the cracks and allowing the oil and gas resources to
seep or flow more freely into well for extraction through the well bore.!!
The origins of fracking however, date back to around the Civil War period, when
in 1866 Edward A.L. Roberts was granted US patent no. 59,936 (US Patents Office,
1875). His invention was known as the “Exploding Torpedo,” which aided in the process
for recovering petroleum by use of an underground nuclear explosion. The invention
resulted in conventional oil production increases of 1,200% within the first week after
underground explosion, helping his company to flourish while also helping other
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companies do the same to their wells. This invention gave birth to the modern day
fracking industry, where Roberts’ patent is said to have been responsible for more civil
litigation in defense of a patent than any one in US history (Wells, 2014).
The next evolution of the Exploding Torpedo came in 1947, in Grant County,
Kansas, where the very first experimental hydraulic fracturing treatment took place in a
natural gas play (Suchy and Newell, 2012). Similarly to what fueled Roberts’ invention,
the treatment was performed to bypass a clogging in the oil-bearing rock formation,
though this treatment had no connection to shale formations. Two years later on March
17, 1949, the first two commercial hydraulic fracturing operations were successfully
completed. The Halliburton and Stanolid Co. performed one on an oil well near Duncan,
Oklahoma and another on an oil well near Holliday, Texas (Suchy and Newell, 2012).
These initial treatments were unsophisticated, but the production trials provided
enhancement to existing methods and the potential for advancement in the techniques,
fluids, modeling and types of hydrocarbon extraction was made further known.
In the mid-1970s when energy spending began to increase, a partnership of
private oil and natural gas operators, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and
predecessor agencies, and the Gas Research Institute combined to develop the
technologies for the commercial production of natural gas from the Devonian shale play
in the eastern US (US EIA, 2011). The collaboration helped to foster the technologies of
3D imaging and mapping, horizontal drilling, slick-water fracturing, and multi-stage
fracturing, that later became crucial to the economical production of crude oil and natural
gas from shale formations. Due to the capital-intensive nature of the industry however,
minimal incentives resulted in risky investments needed for development and such
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investments were rare for smaller oil and gas firms in the beginning, as innovations in
technologies within the oil and gas industry are difficult to maintain as proprietary.
Instead, the larger and more independent firms made these expenditures with the aid of
government spending in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Most notable was Mitchell Energy,
a large private company headed by George Mitchell, for its work in developing shale.
Mitchell Energy was the first company to correctly combine the practices after
trial and error and $250 million of internal investment (Steward, 2007) in research and
development from 1981-1997. Although faced with much doubt and opposition they were
wasting time and money, Mitchell Energy was incrementally able to create the
improvements needed to perfect the practices, thus lowering costs of extraction and
enabling profitable shale gas production (US EIA, 2011). Further evidence that
technology has improved within the industry can be seen in the time it has taken to drill a
well. Halliburton began an ambitious program in 2009 to improve its drilling practices.
The results reduced average drilling days per well from 18-20 to less than 9, and provided
company savings of $75,000 per drilling day saved (Halliburton, 2011).
Literature Review!
To put the volatility of US energy markets into perspective, a study by Regnier
(2007) found that crude oil, refined petroleum, and natural gas prices are more volatile
than prices for about 95% of products sold by domestic producers. She also found that
relative to crude commodities, crude oil prices are currently more volatile than about 65%
of other products. Generally speaking however, studies on oil markets are widely
available, such as the one by Yang, Hwang and Huang (2002) that researched the factors
affecting price volatility of the US oil market. Their model attempted to forecast this
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volatility and predicted an increase in oil prices following a 4% cut in OPEC production.
Another study by Ghalayini (2012) studied oil price volatility and the factors that affect
oil spot price. The results found that together, five variables of oil price, oil demand and
supply, the dollar-exchange rate value and activity in futures markets validate a long-run
relationship. Further, the estimates of the Vector Error Correction Model showed that
supply negatively influences oil spot price in the long run, but demand is a significant
explanatory power in the short run only.
Chin, Le Blanc and Coition (2005) took an approach from another school of
thought to the determination of crude oil prices, which is that commodity markets are
generally efficient and futures prices have the power to forecast realized spot prices. Not
too surprisingly their widely supported approach showed futures prices to be unbiased
predictors of future spot prices, although the prediction error was large. Other hypotheses
for the fractions of oil price variations not explained by oil inventories include: the
difference between spot and futures prices, speculation defined as the long-run positions
held by non commercials of oil, gasoline and heating oil in the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) futures market, OPEC’s spare capacity along with the relative level
of US commercial stocks, and finally, different long-run and short-run interest rates
(Ghalayini, 2012).
Less pronounced, unfortunately, are studies for natural gas markets. One study by
Acaravci, Ozturk, and Kandir (2012) showed a unique long-term equilibrium relationship
between natural gas prices, industrial production and stock prices in five European Union
countries. Kinnaman (2011) estimated a 1% increase in the price of natural gas would
increase the number of new wells drilled by 2.70%. Other existing studies primarily
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integrate natural gas markets with oil markets, which I believe buries the effects that
natural gas is having on the current US energy outlook. However, given the impeding
greenhouse gas goals and regulations, new natural gas studies are beginning to relate to
changes in the electric power sector, of which has undergone a transformation due to the
rise in the availability and use of shale gas. Already seen have been some of the most
significant changes in the operation of the electricity generation portfolio since World
War II, due to the use of natural gas in its production.
Simulating the impacts of forthcoming EPA rules on power plants,
decarbonization options, and other environmental regulatory options such as the
expansion of natural gas use outside of the power sector, the models of Logan et al
(2013) showed a strong growth in natural gas generation and a 2.5-fold increase in
natural gas demand by 2050. Further regarding environmental stewardship, Jacoby,
O’Sullivan and Paltsev (2012) reviewed the policy impact of shale gas by analyzing two
scenarios of greenhouse gas control—one mandating renewable generation and coal
retirement, the other using price to achieve a 50% emissions reduction. The results
showed shale gas benefitting the national economy and easing the task of emissions
control, likely providing support for the continued fuel switching of power plants to
natural gas in order to meet renewable portfolio standards.
In terms of shale energy production, Rystad Energy (2012) stated that shale oil
resources in the US became economically exploitable at oil prices between $45 and $70
per barrel, with higher quality shales such as the Bakken and Eagleford plays closer to the
lower bound. The production of shale oil also has lagged that of shale gas by several
years according to Aguilera and Radetzki (2014), because of the forces on prices seen in
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the industry resulting in the exploitation of alternative fuel sources. Brigida (2014)
investigated the switching relationship between natural gas and crude oil futures prices
and found that natural gas and crude oil prices are cointegrated. His analysis showed that
the two prices did not permanently decouple in the early 2000s, but rather experienced a
temporary shift in regimes, which I believe to be a credit to the advances in production of
shale gas years earlier than shale oil.
Regardless, shale extraction is still at a relatively young stage and whatever one
thinks about shale gas today, with many holding concerns about its environmental
consequences, there is no denying the economic return on taxpayer investments. Shale is
largely influencing structural changes in US energy markets, helping to bring more
domestic energy independence and likely allowing the United States to go from net gas
importer to a net gas exporter over the next decade. Concentrating studies to those related
to the prices of crude oil and natural gas, there have been no existing estimates to
quantify any changes in energy prices seen post shale boom. Considering the demand and
supply side, my analysis in this paper will provide insight on the pricing in both natural
gas and crude oil commodities markets, estimating domestic US spot prices and four
futures contracts for each resource. I believe the estimates provided in this paper have
great potential to spawn into further research once more fracking-related data comes
available.!
Theoretical Model and Data!
It is simple microeconomic theory to expect that an increase in the supply of a
good will lead to a reduction in the price of that good. In addition, theory follows that a
decline in price of a good should lead to a decrease in demand for substitute goods, and
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thus a decrease in prices of substitute goods. In the case of energy markets, it can also be
theorized that prices of energy are explained well by the available supply of the resource.
To explain the prices of crude oil I follow the model of Yang, Hwang and Huang (2002),
which is actually an inverse oil demand function, seen in equation (1):
(1)

Oil Price = !0 + !1 Natural Gas Price + !2 Coal Price + !3 Real GDP + !4 Oil
Consumption

Altering this model to account for a supply shock, I follow with a theoretical model to
explain natural gas prices with variables for oil price, coal price, real GDP and natural
reserves. My initial model is as follows in equation (2):
(2)

Natural Gas Price = !0 + !1 Oil Price + !2 Coal Price + !3 Real GDP + !4 Natural
Gas Reserves +!5 Other Variables

The theoretical model I use for oil is similar, as a variety of factors go into explaining
crude oil prices. These factors can include production quotas set by OPEC and oil
reserves in addition to those variables in the initial model. Also important I theorize is the
number of oil and gas rigs in operation, which provides a variable related to exploration
efforts, potentially portraying a positive signal to investors. The crude oil model is shown
in equation (3):
(3)

Oil Price = !0 + !1 Natural Gas Price + !2 Coal Price + !3 Real GDP + !4 Oil
Reserves + !5 Active Rigs + !6 Other Variables

For the analysis of energy prices affecting GDP I use an even more basic model than
exists in the literature, with GDP as the dependent variable and the associated energy
prices as the independent variables of concern, to go along with several other independent
variables. The initial model to test this relation between energy is as seen in equation (4):

!

11

(4)

US Real GDP = !0 + !1 Energy Price + !2 Population + !3 Energy
Consumption/Supply + !4 Other Variables

The time series monthly data used in the analysis cover a maximum range of January
1973 to April 2014 (not all variables cover this complete range), and come from several
sources, primarily the EIA. For definitional purposes, a spot price is the price for a onetime open market transaction for immediate delivery of a specific quantity of product at a
specific location where the commodity is purchased "on the spot" at current market rates
(US EIA). A futures price is the price quoted for delivering a specified quantity of a
commodity at a specified time and place in the future (US EIA).
The Henry Hub natural gas spot price (NG Spot) and the West Texas Intermediate
crude oil spot price (Crude Spot) are the two spot prices used for analysis in this paper.
Both the NYMEX crude oil and NYMEX natural gas futures data came in four contracts,
with the first contract specifying the earliest delivery date and expiring on the third
business day of the month preceding the delivery month. The second through fourth
contracts represent the successive delivery months following the first contract. Each of
these data sets came from the EIA, and are a monthly average of the respective daily
prices. The units for the natural gas are dollars per British thermal unit, and for crude oil
are dollars per barrel.
I also found data for NYMEX Central Appalachian coal futures prices from the
EIA. These data only had a range covering 2006-12, or 98 observations with only 36 after
the shale boom, so I opted to proxy for coal price with average retail electricity prices
(Electricity). These data also come from the EIA and are an average of the retail
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electricity prices seen by residential, commercial, industrial, and the electric power
sector, and are represented as cents per kilowatt hour, including taxes.
The Real GDP data, in billions of dollars, I obtained from an online source,
Macro Advisers. This data could be a potential criticism, but it was one of the few
sources I could find with monthly GDP data and I opted to use this GDP data as opposed
to expanding the quarterly GDP from the St. Louis FRED. For natural gas reserves I used
data for total natural gas in underground storage (NG Storage) from the EIA, which is a
composite of the inventory of natural gas stored underground in several sources,
including: depleted reservoirs in oil and/or gas fields, aquifers, and salt cavern
formations. The data are represented in billion cubic feet and included because I believe
the total inventory of natural gas should be a direct effect of the increases in natural gas
supply after the shale boom. The natural gas consumption data (NG Cons) come from the
EIA and have the same units, representing total monthly US consumption of natural gas.
For crude oil reserves I opted to try several different production variables
throughout the analysis. The variables include crude oil stocks (CO Stocks), crude oil
production (CO Prod), and active rigs (Rigs). Crude oil stocks represent the inventories
of crude oil stored for future use, reported at the last day of the month in thousand
barrels. Crude oil production is the volume of crude oil produced from US oil reservoirs,
reported as a monthly average in thousand barrels per day. The active rig data are the
total number of rigs (both crude oil and natural gas) that are, on average, crewed and
working every day of the month.
Lastly, two other variables were used to further control for seasonal demand of
natural gas. The variables are: heating degree days (HDD) and cooling degree days
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(CDD), and are taken from the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA)
Climate Prediction Center. The data represent the average number of days per month, and
capture the seasonal demand for energy needed to heat or cool houses and business. The
data are calculated on a grid system by the NOAA and are constructed as a composite for
the entire US. Summary statistics for each variable can found below in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Coal Fut.

96

60.6265

16.929

39.61

119.7

NG Spot

206

4.717

2.33

1.72

13.42

NG Fut. 1

242

4.3848

2.4025

1.426

13.454

NG Fut. 2

242

4.4811

2.4579

1.448

13.827

NG Fut. 3

242

4.5526

2.5057

1.49

14.178

NG Fut. 4

243

4.5829

2.5178

1.519

14.01

Crude Spot

338

41.1998

30.2245

11.35

133.88

CO Fut. 1

371

40.1455

29.0987

11.31

134.02

CO Fut. 2

350

40.811

30.0877

11.3

134.52

CO Fut. 3

372

40.1673

29.4771

11.35

134.78

CO Fut. 4

350

40.7931

30.4086

11.49

134.89

Electricity

318

7.182

2.0269

3

10.7

Real GDP

262

12,928.71

2,025

9,153.57

15,993.09

CDD

493

104.4909

116.0212

1

405

HDD

493

373.4199

322.7423

3

1,184

NG Cons

492

1,751.398

406.956

939.93

2,911.58

NG Storage

460

6,389.855

784.7395

4,446

8,294.3

CO Stocks

494

793,050.5

255,713.6

233,035

1,094,891

CO Produced

494

7,111.995

1,368.396

3,979.811

9,395.214

Energy Cons.

492

7,294.755

944.8498

5,439.4

9,456.532

Rigs

496

2,900.24

850.04

1,549

5,367

!
Methodology – Natural Gas
Altering the generic model of Yang, Hwang and Huang (2002) to create a supplyside model, I ran ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to explain natural gas spot
prices with the independent variables of crude oil spot price, electricity retail price, real
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GDP, and natural gas consumption simply to view some preliminary results. This initial
regression did not provide an answer to my research question, so to help provide an
answer and an estimate I created a dummy variable (Shale Boom) to put into the model,
which took the value of zero for each month before January 2010 and one thereafter. I
was unable to find literature specifying an exact month and year associated with the shale
boom, so I tested the dummy variable by backdating, where I found the time period
around the beginning of 2010 to fit the model appropriately.
Adding this dummy variable to the model, the output for this regression can be
seen as regression 2 in Table 2 below. The output showed significance at the 99% level
for each of the explanatory variables except the consumption variable. The negative
coefficient on the dummy variable was also significant at the 99% level. Being that I also
wanted to control for demand and potentially seasonality for energy consumption, I then
added variables for CDD and HDD. This regression can be seen as regression 3 in Table
2. The results of this model stayed consistent for each variable, significant at the 99%
level with the exception of HDD, which was only significant at the 95% level. This
model also showed improvement on its coefficients, as I was able to obtain the desired
significances and provided a univariate interpretation that the slope of the average price
for the time period before 2010 and the period after were in fact statistically different, but
it still did not provide an answer to my research question or an estimate for a price
change.
Looking to control for a time trend and further control for seasonality, I added
year and month variables to control for each of these trends to finally create a time series
regression. Adding time variables to the model with this dummy variable created what is
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known as a kinked regression, estimating a disconnect, which can be a jump or fall, in the
fitted regression line of a time series model for price at a point in time. If significant, the
dummy variable indicates that there has been a statistically significant change in price
after the shale boom, where its coefficient provides an estimate for the price change. The
output for this model is shown as regression 4 in Table 2 (the month variables are omitted
from each table for the purposes of a neater paper).
!
Table 2. Initial Results 1-6 and Initial Times Series Results 5 & 6 (Level-Level)
Dependent Variable: Natural Gas Spot Price (in $/million Btu)
Variable

Initial

Shale Boom

2

3

-.4.35***
(.3145)

-4.3396***
(.3136)

-1.7284***
(.4143176)

4

-.7698*
(.4597147)

5

Crude Spot

0.02466**
(.0118623)

.0533***
(.0087)

.0565***
(.0087)

.03106***
(.0071989)

.03987***
(.007222)

Electricity

-.99943***
(.2821926)

-.7454***
(.2025)

.64022**
(.2864903)

.73204***
(.275572)

Real GDP

0.0012017***
(.0002555)

.00115***
(.00018)

-.9347***
(.22515)
.
0012***
(.00019)

.002735***
(.0003425)

.00211***
(.0003618)

NG Storage

-.0007259***
(.0002062)

-.0005***
(.00015)

-.00047***
(.00015)

-.0038***
(.0003623)

-.0034***
(.0003576)

CDD

.004***
(.0015)

.0107**
(.0041731)

.0089**
(.0040249)

HDD

.0012**
(.00057)

.00195
(.0018047)

.0023153
(.0017326)

-.64592***
(.1494741)

104.05***
(25.27113)

Year
Year2

.0261***
(.006301)

Intercept
2

Adjusted R
F-Stat P-Val
N

-0.0052674
(2.754248)

-3.6*
(1.9859)

-4.3532***
(1.9925)

1,278.91***
(293.2331)

-103,690***

. 2805
0.0000
204

.6324
0.0000
204

.6416
0.0000
204

.8059
0.0000
204

.8216
0.0000
204

(25,338.48)

Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.!
!
!

The coefficient estimates from regression 4 came with some lowered
significances, but importantly the dummy variable remained significant at the 99% level,
meaning there is potentially a difference in the price of natural gas before and after the
shale boom. Taking a further look into transforming several of the variables, I looked at
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the scatterplots of the dependent variable and each independent variable and found there
to be a nonlinear trend in the plot of NG Spot and Year. I then added a Year2 term to the
model to help remedy this nonlinearity, where the results of this regression are shown in
regression 5 above. Several of other the variables also seemed to have nonlinear trends,
particular in the plots of the other prices and GDP. I did not worry about these trends as
much as the next step I used was to natural log-transform each variable, which is a
technique to remedy the nonlinearities. The estimates of the newly transformed variables
and level CDD and HDD variables are seen in regression 6 in Table 3 below.
Table 3. Time Series Transformed and Robust Regressions (Ln-Ln)
Dependent Variable: Natural Gas Spot Price
Variable

6

7

Robust

(Level CDD, HDD,
Time)

(Level Time)

(Level CDD, HDD,
Time)

Shale Boom

-.0692945
(.069799)

-.0806934
(.0720494)

-.210772***
(.0647463)

Crude Spot

0.3402***
(.0641845)

.334458***
(.0649638)

.284006***
(.0735377)

Electricity

1.43466***
(.3536158)

1.40495***
(.3607344)

1.41479***
(.4269131)

Real GDP

5.357***
(.7715423)

5.35915***
(.7921986)

7.20031***
(.7569968)

NG Storage

-4.62353***
(.3596769)

-4.8025***
(.3340012)

-4.95654***
(.3619154)

CDD

.0012795**
(.0006225)

-.08364**
(.0406382)

.0015118*
(.0007777)

HDD

.0006429**
(.000265)

-.048797
(.0589034)

.0006368**
(.0002652)

Year

18.28996***
(4.029654)

17.28***
(4.126268)

-.136586***
(.023635)

Year2

-.0045906***
(.0010039)

-.00434***
(.001028)

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Intercept

-18,230.63***
(4,040.665)

-17,220***
(4,137.359)

245.7498***
(41.14185)

Adjusted R2
F-Stat P-Val
N

. 8960
0.0000
204

.8937
0.0000
204

Not Provided
0.0000
204

Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses. Time indicates the month and year variables,
robust regression omits Year2 due to collinearity present with this method.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.

Regression 6 relatively had the same statistical significances, however the dummy
variable had no statistical significance. I then tried the model with natural log-
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transformed CDD and HDD variables, but the output resulted in the same insignificance
for the dummy variable. Looking further into this issue I checked for heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation to see if either of these issues could be affecting the standard errors
and consequentially resulting in incorrect significance tests. To test for heteroskedasticity
I used two tests in Stata: the Cameron and Trivedi’s test for heteroskedasticity, and also
the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg (BP/CW) test. Not too surprisingly with a time series
model each of the tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of a constant error term
variance, meaning that heteroskedasticity was not likely affecting the model.
I then tested the model for serial correlation by computing the Durbin-Watson
(DW) statistic for each regression. The DW statistic for regression 7 was roughly .58, and
that for regression 8 was .56. As the DW statistic is constrained to ! [0,4], the statistic
for each regression showed there to be a presence of positive serial correlation. This
meant the coefficients were unbiased, but the standard errors in each regression were not
efficient. With a serial correlation problem likely affecting the significances of each
variable I decided to use Newey-West standard errors to estimate the model robustly,
which remedied the issue by providing more efficient standard errors.
The results of these turned out to be as predicted, largely improving the standard
errors for each variable and most resulting importantly again in a significant dummy
variable. However, important to take note of was a collinearity issue with the robust
outputs, resulting in the Year2 term being dropped, and thus changing the coefficient
estimates. The outputs for this robust regression can be seen above in Table 3, which is
the chosen model for natural gas spot prices with level CDD and HDD variables for
interpretation purposes.
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The next set of regressions run were those for the natural gas futures contracts.
Table 4 includes the regressions for contract 1, which were run in a similar fashion to the
spot prices. This time each estimate was run as a time series regression, but again starting
with level-level regressions and then transforming variables to find the model of best fit
to provide the most accurate estimate for the Shale Boom dummy variable. The only new
additions to the model are the spot prices for crude oil and natural gas, as the literature
suggests futures contract prices trend towards spot prices in the long run, explained by
arbitrage and the results of supply and demand.!
Table 4. Time Series Transformed and Robust Regressions
Dependent Variable: Natural Gas Futures Price - Contract 1
Variable

9

10

11

Robust Fut. C1

(Level-Level)

(Ln-Ln except Time)

(Ln-Ln except Time)

(Ln-Ln except Time)

Shale Boom

-.2003545**
(.0857381)

-.0433596***
(.0145709)

-.0445082***
(.0140114)

-.0608375***
(.0176356)

NG Spot

1.002411***
(.0138006)

.956557***
(.0153693)

.9586072***
(.0136907)

.9751786***
(.0144357)

Crude Spot

0.0025814*
(.0014603)

.030131**
(.0144466)

.0314991**
(.0136556)

.0252648*
(.0150882)

Electricity

-.0830055
(.0531331)

-.0667634
(.0784999)

-.0799503**
(.0645131)

-.1312401*
(.0771285)

Real GDP

-.0000745
(.0000742)

.0540586
(.1823982)

NG Storage

.0002672***
(.000076)

.175987*
(.1011635)

.1892864**
(.0904429)

-.2470635**
(.0977686)

Year

6.199195
(4.980772)

1.823322**
(.9014736)

1.906988**
(.8540191)

.0037559
(.0029856)

Year2

-.0015441
(.0012424)

-.0004546**
(.0002247)

-.0004752**
(.0002132)

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Intercept

-6,223.225
(4,991.844)

-1,830.02**
(903.4211)

-1,914.709**
(854.9244)

-9.478348*
(5.564213)

Adjusted R2
F-Stat P-Val
N

.9938
0.0000
204

.9953
0.0000
204

.9953
0.0000
204

Not Provided
0.0000
204

Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses. Time indicates the month and year variables,
robust regression omits Year2 due to collinearity present with this method.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level

Before the robust estimation, the model for natural gas futures contract 1 also had
issues with heteroskedasticity and positive serial correlation. Again to remedy this issue
the model was estimated with Newey-West standard errors, where the estimates are seen
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in bold above in Table 4. This estimate also dropped the coefficient for Year2 due to
collinearity and consequentially changing the estimates, but the estimate for a change in
price was statistically significant at the 99% level, indicating a decline in price after the
shale boom for the first futures contract.
The outputs for natural gas futures contracts 2-4 are next in Table 5, which only
includes the robust final chosen models for each contract. Each final model differs
slightly from the next as the successive contracts were explained better by the previously
issued contracts and less explained by the original variables in my model.
!
Table 5. Time Series Transformed and Robust Regressions (Ln-Ln)
Dependent Variable: Natural Gas Futures Price - Contracts 2, 3, 4
Variable

Fut. C2

Fut. C3

Fut. C4

Robust (Level: Time)

Robust (Level: Time)

Robust (Level: Time)

Shale Boom

-.0387236***
(.0096893)

-.0224894***
(1.793277)

-.031463***
(.0091433)

NG Fut. 1

1.445059***
(.0869077)

-1.038668***
(.1078576)

.1671288**
(.071518)

1.793277***
(.077212)

-.908356***
(.1746851)

NG Fut. 2
NG Fut. 3

1.715067***
(.110912)

NG Spot

-.4733885***
(.0862718)

.2226782***
(.0537025)

Crude Spot

.0048558
(.0076242)

Electricity

.0581794
(.0447162)

NG Cons.

-.0124238
(.0314863)

-.1069789***
(.0383427)

Year

.0029109
(.0018148)

.0040634
(.0009438)

.0037074***
(.0009212)

Year2

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Intercept

-3.824072
(1.701719)

-7.28846
(1.701719)

-7.37569***
(1.833306)

Adjusted R2
F-Stat P-Val
N

Not Provided
0.0000
204

Not Provided
0.0000
204

Not Provided
0.0000
204

Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses. Time indicates the month and year variables,
robust regression omits Year2 due to collinearity present with this method.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level
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The same transformation techniques were applied to the early regressions for each
natural gas futures contract before choosing the final estimates in Table 5, except natural
gas consumption showed to be more powerful when explaining contracts 2-4 instead of
the supply variable. Each model exhibited the same problems with heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation, which led to each model being robustly run with Newey-West
standards errors to remedy, and again the Year2 term was omitted due to collinearity. The
robust regressions resulted in a significant shale boom dummy variable with 99%
confidence for each of the contracts, indicating the shale boom has had a downward
effect on natural gas futures prices as well. Although not provided in the regression
outputs, each of the non-robust outputs had very high adjusted-R2 estimates similar to the
early outputs seen in Table 4 for contract 1, potentially indicating a problem with the
model.
Results and Interpretations – Natural Gas Prices!
The regressions for both natural gas spot and futures prices included only 204
observations, limited by the variation of dates available for each variable. The fit of the
models improved with each new regression run after incorporating the chosen
explanatory variables and corresponding transformations, and interestingly enough each
of the final models was explained by a different combination of variables. The final
model for natural gas spot price concluded with the robust regression in Table 3 with the
level CDD and HDD variables. This model was chosen as the representative model as it
included the variables that follow theory most appropriately to go along with its
significant coefficient estimates. The interpretations of this model are straight forward
and are as follows: the dummy variable reads (by kinked regression) that for the years
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following the shale boom, starting in January 2010, there has been an associated 21.08%
decline in the spot price of natural gas, clearly following the hypothesis and economic
theory that an increase in the supply of a good leads to a decline in its price.
The rest of the variables are not as important but they are still important in the
regression as they help to provide a more accurate estimate for the price decline, but they
are as follows: the coefficient on crude oil spot price reads that a 1% increase in the price
of crude oil associates with a .28% increase in the spot price of natural gas; a 1% increase
in the average retail price of electricity associates with a 1.41% increase in the price; a
1% increase in real GDP associates with a 7.2% increase in the price; a 1% increase in
the underground storage of natural gas associates with a 4.96% decline in the price; a
one-day increase in the average monthly number of cooling degree days associates with a
.15% increase in the price of natural gas, and a one-day increase for that of heating
degree days associates with a .063% increase in the price of natural gas.
The year variable reads that as each year passes there is an associated 13.66%
decline in the price of natural gas. The Year2 variable was omitted from the robust
regressions due to collinearity with the year variable. I attempted to change the lag term
in the Stata command, but still could not come up with an explanation; I assume it may
be a problem embedded within the data. The intercept term in the regression was
significant, but in a natural log-transformed model this estimate does not provide a
meaningful interpretation.
Similarly, the first contract for natural gas futures prices showed a statistically
significant decline after the shale boom, though it is smaller than the decline in spot price
at 6.08%. The smaller decline in price is due to what I presume to be the idea that futures

!

22

contracts contain more information based on their historical tendencies and trends
towards spot prices. If futures prices trend toward spot prices it means they already
contain most of the information that spot prices hold. The final models did vary from the
model for spot price; I noticed the futures prices for contracts 2-4 seemed to be better
explained by the demand side of natural gas.
The effects of the shale boom however, became smaller for each successive
contract with the exception of contract 4, which saw almost 1% larger of a price decline
than that of contract 3. Formally, contract 2 saw a 3.87% decline, contract 3 a 2.25%
decline, and contract 4 a 3.15% decline. Interesting also were the explanatory variables of
contract 4, which only included the previous three contracts in addition to the time series
year and month variables. The futures contract outputs also lost explanatory variables
from the initial model with each successive contract, while adding previous futures
contracts as explanatory variables to each successor contract.
Methodology – Crude Oil
The next set of regressions run attempt apply the same sets of prices, however the
prices are instead for those of crude oil. Beginning with the spot price, in Table 6 below,
similar transformations to the initial model used were used to create the new outputs.
Only included this time are the outputs with the shale boom dummy variable, along with
the new variables applied to the initial model for crude oil. The initial level-level model
in regression 16 was run with a bit of uncertainty for what it would show; but it provided
an output to work with and gave me an idea of where the model may be in need of
improvement. Checking the model for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, both
issues were present according to the BP/CW test and DW statistic. The next step was a
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natural-log transformation to each of the variables, with the exception of CDD and HDD.
This model showed some improvement in terms of significances for each variable,
however, the sign on the shale boom dummy variable was the opposite of expected.
Table 6. Time Series Transformed and Robust Regressions (Ln-Ln)
Dependent Variable: Crude Oil Spot Price ($/Barrel)
Variable

16

17

18

Robust

(All Lev-Lev)

(Level CDD,
HDD, Time)

(Level HDD,
Time)

(Level HDD,
Time)

Shale Boom

15.68721***
(4.149342)

.1941648***
(.0719757)

.1789945**
(.0709088)

.1976814*
(.1154688)

NG Spot

3.3239***
(.5362503)

.3017801***
(.0560205)

.2996438***
(.0560537)

.2357341***
(.0526917)

Electricity

18.87333***
(2.85837)

1.56762***
(.4365683)

1.590658***
(.4366204)

1.566828***
(.4313556)

Real GDP

0.016795***
(.0036055)

2.552066***
(.8886913)

2.54632***
(.8896651)

2.926714**
(1.203324)

CO Stocks

-0.0000768***
(.0000221)

-.6199078*
(.3697242)

-.662246*
(.3684056)

-.6160952
(.4145303)

CDD

-.0224472
(.037277)

-.0007732
(.0006519)

HDD

-.0398695***
(.0147791)

-.0005314*
(.0002727)

-.000456*
(.0002655)

.0568471
(.0490203)

Rigs

.0008522
(.0029364)

.3897712***
(.133699)

.3843382***
(.1337689)

.4588361***
(.0935809)

Year

-1,220.075***
(298.1201)

-3.647247
(6.427659)

-4.188701
(6.418548)

.0138128
(.0341169)

Year2

.3033335***
(.0742279)

.0009141
(.0015991)

.0010493
(.0015969)

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Intercept

1,226,594
(299,323.2)

3,619.565
(6,455.26)

4,162.404
(6,446.166)

-50.85197
(58.80458)

Adjusted R2
F-Stat P-Val
N

. 9155
0.0000
204

.9389
0.0000
204

.9388
0.0000
204

Not Provided
0.0000
204

Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses. Time indicates the month and year variables,
robust regression omits Year2 due to collinearity present with this method.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level!
!
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The tests for heteroskedasticity on this model were uncertain, as the BP/CW test
failed to reject the null of a constant error term variance, but yet the Cameron & Trivedi
test rejected the null. The DW statistic was very low at .276, indicating positive serial
correlation. Further looking into the model, joint significance testing of the CDD and
HDD variables failed to reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are jointly
insignificant in regression 17 above, which meant the insignificant CDD variable could
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be dropped. Rerunning the model without CDD provided the results seen in regression
18. This estimate also had the same issues with heteroskedasticity uncertainty and serial
correlation, so I ran the same regression robustly with Newey-West standard errors to
estimate the bolded regression in Table 6 above, although the Year2 term was dropped
due to collinearity. This final chosen model for crude oil spot price showed a price
increase statistically significant at the 90% level.
Table 7. Time Series Transformed and Robust Regressions
Dependent Variable: Crude Oil Futures Price (Contract 1)
Variable

20

21

22

Robust

(Level-Level)

(Ln-Ln except Time)

(Ln-Ln except Time)

(Ln-Ln except Time)

Shale Boom

.1339553*
(.0683502)

.0009704
(.001441)

.0011326
(.0014232)

-.0022479**
(.0010067)

CO Spot

.997445***
(.0011777)

.9961501***
(.001465)

.9953113***
(.0011715)

.9961282***
(.0017216)

NG Spot

-.0003721
(.0087973)

.0006119
(.0010629)

Electricity

.0953435*
(.0515065)

.0144536
(.0090306)

.0130862*
(.0073904)

.003952
(.0078943)

Real GDP

-.000013
(.00006067)

-.0108531
(.0178068)

CO Stocks

.00000144***
(.000000366)

.0279118***
(.0074033)

.0269406***
(.0075072)

.0239197***
(.0084248)

Rigs

.0000375
(.0000476)

.0037221
(.0027108)

.0047556**
(.0019094)

.0030001
(.0022608)

Year

6.717884
(5.021401)

.1541496
(.1268037)

.208923***
(.0698648)

.0004741*
(.0002735)

Year2

-.0016807
(.00125)

-.0000384
(.0000315)

-.0000521***
(.0000175)

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Intercept

-6,714.827
(5,042.722)

-154.8999
(127.3559)

-209.8987
(69.91694)

-1.2977**
(.5824447)

Adjusted R2
F-Stat P-Val
N

1.0000
0.0000
204

1.0000
0.0000
204

1.0000
0.0000
228

Not Provided
0.0000
228

Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses. Time indicates the month and year variables,
robust regression omits Year2 due to collinearity present with this method.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level

Moving to the futures contracts for crude oil, the outputs for contract 1 are shown
above in Table 7. The same methodology from the natural gas futures contracts applied
here, except the variable for active rigs was added to the model. Again left out of the
table were CDD and HDD variables, as they had no significance when testing the initial
!
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model. Problems with the model were evident from the initial output. Many of the
variables were insignificant and a very high adjusted R2 value blatantly stuck out. Natural
log-transformation was done to each of the variables and I reran the regression only to
find similar results. Continuing with the model transformation the variables of natural gas
spot price and real GDP were dropped, as they were the most insignificant variables and
also not jointly significant. This estimate is shown in Table 7 as regression 22. The
significances for each variable in the regression improved, but the adjusted R2 value was
still perfectly high (1.000) and indicating a potential problem. I then tested the next two
most insignificant variables for joint significance, electricity price and active rigs, to see
if either could be dropped. These to variables showed to be jointly significant however,
which I believe could be due to a relation between electricity prices and the number of
natural gas rigs included in the active count. Next I tested the model for
heteroskedasticity to find it present, and also for serial correlation where the DW statistic
of 1.85 indicated the model was likely free of serial correlation. Due to the high adjusted
R2 value and presence of heteroskedasticity, I still decided to run the model robustly with
Newey-West standard errors to obtain the final chosen model, bolded in Table 7 above.
Continuing with crude oil contracts 2-4, the same analysis and intuition were used
but each prior contract was added to the model for its successor(s) similarly to the models
for the natural gas futures contracts. The final robust chosen models for each contract are
shown below in Table 8. These contracts had very similar final models, where I ran each
final model robustly due to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Although the robust regressions provided more efficient standard errors there still seemed
to be a problem with the models somewhere as the adjusted R2 value was extremely high
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for each before running with robustness. I chose each model by transforming the
independent variables to remedy any premeditated problems, and then systematically
eliminating the variables that did not have significance in the successive contracts.
Table 8. Time Series Transformed and Robust Regressions
Dependent Variable: Crude Oil Futures Price (Contracts 2, 3, 4)
Variable

Fut. C2
Robust

Fut. C3
Robust

(Level Time)

(Level Time)

(Level Time)

Shale Boom

-.0237876***
(.0043197)

-.0008403
(.0012098)

-.007693
(.000543)

CO Fut. 1

2.745591***
(.4811833)

-.8708932***
(.1261447)

.3142907***
(.0264982)

1.634044***
(.0313757)

-1.467314***
(.0654214)

CO Fut. 2
CO Fut. 3
CO Spot

Fut. C4
Robust

2.149384***
(.0405229)
-1.797509***
(.4795225)

.228106**
(.1067163)

.0436529
(.0402508)

.0350562***
(.0117494)

.0094472**
(.0043815)

CO Stocks

.1517786***
(.0368621)

.0341495***
(.0122818)

.0173995***
(.0065181)

Rigs

.028559***
(.0097808)

.0037478
(.003135)

.0031838**
(.001325)

Year

.0053616***
(.0012226)

-.0000151
(.0003873)

.0000983
(.0001422)

Year2

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Omitted
(Collinearity)

Intercept

-12.94515
(2.586986)

-.5102409
(.844701)

-40.85521
(40.94632)

Adjusted R2
F-Stat P-Val
N

Not Provided
0.0000
228

Not Provided
0.0000
228

Not Provided
0.0000
228

NG Spot
Electricity
Real GDP

Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses. Time indicates the month and year variables,
robust regression omits Year2 due to collinearity present with this method.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level

The first and second crude oil futures contract were the only contracts to show a
decline in price after the shale boom, which I have no explanation for other than a
potentially incorrect model resulting in incorrect estimates for one or a combination of
the model estimates, or contracts three and four simply were not effected. Several of the
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independent variables did change across the models, but the varying significances were
interesting, given the shale boom dummy variable became statistically insignificant after
the second contract. Unlike the last natural gas futures contract, the last crude oil futures
contract had two of the initial explanatory variables included and statistically significant.
Results and Interpretations – Crude Oil Prices
The final model for crude oil spot price included a total of 204 observations; the
final models for the futures prices each included 228. The chosen model for spot prices
was selected as it best represented the problem given the variables. Apparent in the spot
price model though are several problems that were unable to be remedied. The problems
began with extremely high adjusted R2 values and when completing the transformations
for each of the variables in the model, bringing with some uncertainty. Most concerning
however, was the significant and opposite expected sign on the shale boom dummy
variable. The final model indicates an increase in the price has instead occurred, and
estimates it at 19.77%. It is difficult to say if or how accurate the signs and estimate are,
but if the pattern of following world oil price exists then this could very well be a
reasonable estimate. These results go against my hypothesis but they could agree with
that of Aguilera and Radetzki (2014), who state there is only one world oil market and
the only likely effects of the shale boom seen in the US are those relating to its crude oil
imports and exports.
The futures contracts showed some slightly better results, which might indicate an
incorrectly specified spot price model. Strangely, other than the initial level-level model,
none of the outputs for futures contract 1 showed a strong statistically significant shale
boom effect until the model was run robustly. When robustly run, the shale boom
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variable was significant and in the predicted direction at the 95% confidence level. The
decline in price was small though at only .225%, but it was significant nonetheless. The
second contract had a little bit larger of a decline in its price at 2.38%, including
significance at the 99% level. The estimates for contracts 3 and 4 were also in the
predicted negative direction, however, neither had significance at any level and therefore
could not provide a worthy estimate. This either indicates a problem with the model or
simply that the later contracts have not seen an effect from the shale boom.
Collectively between the two models I find it difficult to say whether oil prices
have truly seen changes because of the shale boom. It is known however, that the
increases in shale oil production and supply occurred slightly later than those of shale
gas, which could potentially be a reason for not seeing significant negative changes in oil
prices as of yet. The benefits of the added domestic supply may not have taken full effect
yet and as mentioned earlier the scale of shale oil is much smaller than that of shale gas
and oil shale. Once oil shale can be exploited I am confident a decline in each of the
domestic oil prices will be seen.
Methodology – US GDP and Energy Prices
The methodology I used for this analysis is similar to what was used previously,
with OLS time series regressions. Knowing the potential of an endogeneity problem at
hand, I regressed US real GDP on the energy price variables most importantly, among
others, and assuming that lower energy prices would associate with higher levels of GDP.
The initial regression with crude oil spot price as the important independent price
variable of concern showed significant explanatory variables, indicating that energy
markets largely affect GDP. The only insignificant variable in the initial regression
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showed to be population and the expected sign on crude oil spot price was opposite of
expected. I then decided to drop the population variable and add an energy supply
variable, crude oil stocks, where this output is seen in regression 27 in Table 9 below.
The estimates for this model did not change, every variable was statistically significant
but the estimate on crude oil price still had the opposite sign of what I was looking for.
Table 9. Time Series Regressions for Testing GDP and Energy Pricing Relationship (Ln-Ln)
Dependent Variable: US Real GDP
Variable
CO Spot

27

28

29

30

31

32

(Level Time)

(Level Time)

(Level Time)

(Level Time)

(Level Time)

(Level Time)

.0251238***
(.0041718)

NG Spot

.0306419***
(.0049841)

CO Fut. 1

-.0712581
(.051281)

CO Fut. 2

.0954714*
(0520686)

NG Fut. 1

-.11841***
(.0317146)

NG Fut. 2

.1321266***
(.0321803)

Electricity

-.09069***
(.024339)

Energy Cons.

.2100361***
(.0430113)

CO Stocks

-.0624093**
(.0276183)

NG Storage

-.06286***
(.0217065)

.3241353***
(.050637)

.3871732***
(.0483232)

.2337709***
(.0382091)

.0909774***
(.0293607)

.3116042***
(.0481293)

.2348751***
(.0433614)

Year

3.420895***
(.1962483)

2.213121***
(.2992845)

4.46999***
(.1839696)

3.652245***
(.1997607)

2.962895***
(.2192394)

3.564939***
(.1855436)

Year2

-.0008485
(.000049)

-.0005476
(.0000746)

-.00111***
(.000046)

-.000906***
(.0000499)

-.000734***
(.0000547)

-.000885***
(.0000463)

Intercept

-3,439.545***
(196.3153)

-2,231.3***
(300.1009)

-4,494.644
(184.1165)

-3,677.323
(199.8719)

-2,983.6***
(219.5621)

-3,584.1***
(185.5071)

Adjusted R2
F-Stat P-Val
N

.9908
0.0000
261

.9806
0.0000
204

.9825
0.0000
228

.9865
0.0000
228

.9887
0.000
240

.9907
0.0000
261

Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses. Time indicates the month and year variables,
robust regression omits Year2 due to collinearity present with this method.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level
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I then ran a similar regression again, except using natural gas spot price instead of
crude oil, along with a natural gas storage variable instead of population. The estimates,
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seen in regression 28, were almost identical to those for crude oil, with significant
estimates and an incorrect expected sign on the natural gas price. The third type of price
tested by regression was electricity prices, which finally showed a negative association
with real GDP and is bolded and seen as regression 29 above. Building onto this model, I
added the natural gas storage and energy consumption variables, which seemed to
improve the model slightly in terms of the statistical significance along with the negative
association between price and real GDP. This model is also bolded and seen as regression
30 in Table 9 above.
The last two prices investigated were the futures prices for both commodities.
Each contract was used in a time series model individually, but none provided a
significant negative association with price. The only time a significant and negative
estimate was seen was when several futures contracts were used in the same regression to
explain real GDP, as in regressions 31 and 32 above, yet each output generally showed
one negative association, which was not always significant. I further ran several of the
prices without the time series variables and without the other explanatory variables in the
theoretical model. Each time, the regression of real GDP on the energy price resulted in
an incorrect expected sign.
Results and Interpretations – US GDP and Energy Prices
This analysis seemed to be one that could be relatively simple, but that was not
the case. Every model run with natural gas or crude oil as an explanatory variable
resulted in a sign that was opposite of anticipated. As shown in Table 9, each of these two
commodities prices shows a positive associated increase in real GDP with an increase in
price, not negative as anticipated. The only exception to this was when multiple prices
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were included in a regression, such as those in regression 31 and 32, in which case one
variable obtained the correct sign but the other still had the incorrect one. Further
extending the model beyond just crude oil and natural gas prices, regressions were run
with electricity price as the important explanatory variable. This resulted in some
different results than what had been seen before.
Each regression run showed a decline in real GDP with an increase in the price of
electricity. For example, in regression 30 a 1% increase in the price of electricity
associates with a .063% decline in real GDP. Intuitively this makes sense as when
businesses or households must pay more for the power they use it inhibits them from
spending that money as disposable income elsewhere, constricting GDP growth. Also
attempted in several models was the incorporation of the number of active rigs as an
explanatory variable. None of these outputs were put into a table but including the
variable did nothing to change the sign on the natural gas or crude oil price variables,
though it did magnify the negative relation when included in the models with electricity
prices.
Looking at the correlation tables, the correlations were high between prices and
GDP and none were less than the .4048 between the natural gas spot price and real GDP,
and all were positive as well. Collectively this analysis did little to answer the research
question at hand; there is largely an endogeneity issue in the spurious regressions. The
results made clear the need for a more sophisticated model, such as two-stage least
squares utilizing an instrumental, however they also may be helpful in explaining how
important energy is in macroeconomic modeling given the extremely high goodness of fit
values.
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Conclusion, Discussion and Further Extensions
Following economic intuition the answers this paper provides to the research
questions are interesting and potentially valuable. Following the estimated robust
regression for natural gas spot prices, the results reasonably show there has been a
decline in natural gas spot prices seen in the US in the time period after the shale boom.
Although the number of observations in the time period after 2010 is only 48 (2010 –
2013), I believe this model is the best of them all in this paper. The estimates have the
correct expected signs and the model is just as it controls for both time and seasonality
trends with the year and month variables included in the time series regressions. The
accuracy of the estimate for the decline in price at 21.08% is somewhat uncertain, but the
estimate was significant and in the predicted negative direction.
The results from the natural gas futures contracts also showed similar results. The
final model for the first two contracts showing statistically significant price declines of
6.08% and 3.87%, and the final model for contracts 3 and 4 with statistically significant
declines of 2.25% and 3.15%, respectively. The accuracy of these estimates is also
uncertain and could be further examined, but the analysis still provides a good basis for
natural gas prices.
Oil prices on the other hand showed some unexpected and very uncertain results,
which I believe there might also be an explanation for. The reasoning is that there
currently is only one true world oil market, meaning that what happens in the US (in this
study is price), the market becomes highly diluted and less of an effect is seen. If that is
the case then it can reasonably be assumed that US oil prices are not completely
independent from world oil prices, and they do in fact follow the lone world market. The
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results in this research really seem to reflect the global market, and as Aguilera and
Radetzki (2014) note, the main change related to the oil market in the US is the decline in
US import needs. A further reason however, could be the scale factor of the shale oil
reserves, which is much smaller than that of shale gas and oil shale. Once oil shale can be
further exploited, I predict that a much more significant change in oil prices will occur.
Looking to extend this research further, the first way I see reattempting would be
to find data on fracking costs and operating expenses. I am curious as to whether these
costs get reflected in the commodities’ pricing; I do not believe research has been done
on this idea. Extending this same concept to another angle and depending on any
environmental impacts found, a future explanatory variable that could factor into these
price sets is environmental damage and or prevention. Although the typical well is drilled
to over 7,500 feet below the surface, while the water table is generally at around 1,000
feet, an adverse event could hypothetically increase the price as a result of higher
extraction costs related to ensuring environmental protection and the mass usage of
existing resources such as water.
The environmental concern however, brings in an interesting benefit of fracking.
It is genuinely known that the fracking process uses a liquid combination that is not
necessarily environmentally friendly, but this actually creates an incentive structure. The
issue provides companies and other entrepreneurs the opportunity to invent cleaner
methodologies to incorporate into fracking. This also, is already being seen. A great
example is GasFrac Energy Services (TSX: GFS), which offers a waterless fracking
technology by using a process involving a gelled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) instead
of water. This process sidesteps the water issue as most of the LPG injected into the shale
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is also later extracted and then resold on the market. This is an improvement because in
conventional fracking more than 80% of the water or frac fluid stays in the rock
formation. Nuverra Environmental Solutions (NYSE: NES) offers a variety of services to
shale drillers, including the hauling and treating of the water used in frac jobs. Two other
similar companies, US Silica Holdings (NYSE: SLCA), which mines, process, and sells
commercial silica; and CARBO Ceramics (NYSE: CRR), which manufactures ceramic
proppant, are further examples of innovations to the materials used in fracking, as they
offer products to replace the frac sand used in the process. The materials leave a wider
and more consistent pore space in the shale cracks due to their uniformity, thus
improving the extraction rates and also the quantity of oil and gas believed to be
recoverable in the well. It is examples such as these that I believe are inspirational to the
industry and remove another angle that environmentalists use to attack fracking. If the
materials of or the disposal of frac fluid can be improved, there is a large profit to be
made as well as cost savings for fracking companies.
Another interesting question would be to theorize what would have happened to
US energy markets without shale innovation, specifically without shale gas production.
Along the same lines as that question, a controversial topic would be a research attempt at
whether or not the shale boom would have been possible without the government
investment in energy research. There is no doubt that government energy innovation
investments could be made more efficiently and effectively, but it would be a mistake to
imagine that the US would be better off without them, according to Shellenberger and
Nordhaus (2011). The US has been instrumental to the extension of shale research to
other countries worldwide. Other countries have attempted to copycat the production and
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search processes for shale formations, which has been the recent trend to create a more
diversified world energy market. Countries new to shale gas however, have an advantage
over the US in that the current shale technologies are much more advanced than those
that existed with the early developments in the US. Perhaps new innovations or
adaptations will be needed to exploit the shale plays abroad, but the technologies and jobs
that energy extraction from shale brings will provide a stimulatory benefit to any
economy. The hope for each country with recoverable shale formations is that its reliance
on imports such as natural gas or crude oil will be derailed, and eventually it can obtain a
more diversified and stable energy future through lower energy prices, just as the shale
boom is helping the US to accomplish.
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